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1 Introduction
This paper considers how taxes should optimally be determined in a union-
ized economy with capital accumulation. Palokangas (1987 and 2000, Ch. 4)
shows that in a static general equilibrium framework, aggregate production
efficiency can be maintained even in the presence of labour unions as long as
the government can set specific wage and employment taxes. In this study,
we examine whether this result also holds true in a dynamic general equilib-
rium framework, in which private agents save capital and there is a strategic
interdependence between investors and labour unions.
In a dynamic model with investment, aggregate production efficiency
takes lines up with the Judd-Chamley assertion: capital income should be
taxed at a non-zero rate.1 Because capital functions as an intermediate good,
appearing only in the production but not in the utility function, it should
not be taxed, if there are enough instruments to separate consumption and
production decisions. Chamley (2001) shows that this assertion critically de-
pends on the existence of a perfect bond market, in which private agents take
the interest rate as given, households save in bonds, and firms can finance
any amount of investment by issuing bonds. Instead a perfect bond market,
we assume here that households own shares in firms directly. In such a case,
there is a conflict between workers in a firm and households who invest in
the firm. We show that zero taxation on capital income holds even when
workers are organized in wage-setting monopoly unions.
Lancing (1999) shows that when the capitalists’ utility is logarithmic and
the government faces a balanced-budget constraint, the steady-state optimal
tax on capital income is generally non-zero. We prove that in a unionized
economy this assertion holds only in the very unlikely special case that all
of the following three conditions are simultaneously satisfied: (i) the capi-
talists’ preferences are logarithmic, (ii) there are constant returns to scale in
production, and (iii) the capitalists earn no labour income.
Koskela and von Thadden (2002) show that capital income should be
taxed at a non-zero rate in a unionized economy, but they base this result
on the assumption that a labour union takes capital stock as given. In
this paper, we find it inconsistent to assume that while the union takes the
1Judd (1985), Chamley (1986) and Correia (1996).
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employment effects of its wage policy into account, it simultaneously ignores
the investment effects. Hence, we prefer to assume that a union takes the
employer’s investment behaviour as a constraint. We show that in such a
case the Judd-Chamley result still holds.
In this study, we assume the following. The government is the Stackelberg
leader with respect to the private agents, who take the tax rates as given.
In each industry, the wage-setting monopoly union is the Stackelberg leader
with respect to the firms and investors. There are two groups of households.
The capitalists save and earn all profits and a fixed proportion α of all wages.
The non-capitalists earn the rest (1 − α) of total wages and consume all of
their income. We use parameter α as a measure of income distribution. The
model is then an extension of two special cases: for α = 0, Judd’s (1985) case
in which the capitalists earn only profits and do not work, while the workers
earn only wages and do not save; and for α = 1, Chamley’s (1986) model of
a representative agent who saves and earns both wages and profits.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers
firms and workers in an industry and derives profits and labour income as
functions of employment, capital stock and taxes. Section 3 examines invest-
ment in a single industry, and section 4 the labour union which sets the wage
in an industry. Section 5 constructs the optimal program for the government,
by which optimal public policy is established in section 6.
2 Firms and workers
We aggregate all products in the economy into a single good which is chosen
as the numeraire. There is a fixed number J of similar industries producing
this good. In industry j, the representative firm (hereafter firm j) produces
its output Yj from its capital Kj and labour Lj through technology
Yj = F (Kj, Lj), FK > 0, FL > 0, FLL < 0, FKK < 0, FKL > 0, (1)
where subscript K (L) denotes partial derivatives with respect to Kj (Lj).
Unit labour cost for firm j is given by vj=˙(1 + τW )wj + τL, where wj is the
wage in firm j, τW the wage tax and τL the employment tax. Firm j takes
its unit labour cost vj and capital stock Kj as given and maximizes its profit
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pij = F (Kj, Lj) − vjLj − µKj by labour input Lj, where and the constant
µ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of capital depreciation. This yields the function
pij = Π(Kj, vj)
.
= max
L
[F (Kj, Lj)− vjLj − µKj],
ΠK
.
= ∂Π/∂Kj = FK − µ, Πv .= ∂Π/∂vj = −Lj,
ΠKK(Kj, vj) ≡ 0 ⇔ Π(Kj, vj) = max
`
[F (1, `)− vj`− µ]Kj = ΠK(vj)K,
vj = FL(Kj, Lj), wj = [FL(Kj, Lj)− τL]/(1 + τW ). (2)
We assume that for workers the disutility of employment in terms of
consumption, Z(Lj), increases with the level of employment, Z
′ > 0. We
can then define that labour income in industry j, W j, is equal to wages wjLj
minus the disutility of employment Z. Noting (1) and (2), labour income in
industry j is then obtained as a function of employment, capital and taxes:
W j = W (Lj, Kj, τW , τL)
.
= wjLj − Z = FL(Kj, Lj)− τL
1 + τW
Lj − Z(Lj),
WL
.
=
∂W
∂Lj
=
FLLL+ FL − τL
1 + τW
− Z ′, WK .= ∂W
∂Kj
=
FKLLj
1 + τW
. (3)
3 Investment
We assume that each capitalist invests only in a single industry, for tractabil-
ity.2 The representative capitalist in industry j (hereafter capitalist j) earns
a fixed proportion αj of total labour income
∑
kW
k. The capitalists as a
group earn a fixed proportion α
.
=
∑
j αj of
∑
kW
k. Because each capitalist
is the Stackeberg follower with respect to the wage-setting union in the same
industry, he takes unit labour cost vj as given.
We assume that capitalist j takes his wage revenue αj
∑
kW
k as given.
This can be justified as follows. When a worker invests in capital, the pro-
portion of his portfolio invested in his current employer is so small that he
can ignore the effect of his investment on his own wage revenue. Capitalist
j’s budget constraint is given by
K˙j
.
= dKj/dt = αj
∑
k
W k + (1− τK)Π(Kj, vj)− (1 + τC)Cj, (4)
2If capitalists invested in all industries, then the levels of investment for all industries
would be ‘bang-bang’ controls and the model would be excessively complicated.
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where K˙j is capital accumulation, αj
∑
kW
k exogenous labour income,
Π(Kj, wj) profits, τK tax on capital income, Cj his consumption and τC
consumption tax. Capitalist j’s instantaneous utility is given by
U(Cj)
.
=
{
[C1−σj − 1]/(1− σ) for σ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞),
log Cj for σ = 1,
(5)
where the constant 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Capitalist j chooses his consumption to maximize the flow of utility start-
ing at time zero,
∫∞
0
U(Cj)e
−ρtdt, where t is time and ρ > 0 the rate of time
preference, subject to capital accumulation (4) and the functions (3), taking
unit labour cost in the industry, vj, and his own labour income αj
∑
kW
k as
given. This leads to the Hamiltonian
HCj =U(Cj) + θj
[
αj
∑
k
W k + (1− τK)Π(Kj, vj)− (1 + τC)Cj
]
,
where the co-state variable θj evolves according to
θ˙j = ρθj − ∂H
Cj
∂Kj
= [ρ− (1− τK)ΠK(Kj, vj)]θj, lim
t→∞
θjKje
−ρt = 0. (6)
The first-order condition for the capitalist’s maximization is given by C−σj =
U ′(Cj) = (1 + τC)θj. Noting this, we can transform the constraint (6) into
the capitalist’s Euler equation as follows:
C˙j/Cj = −(1/σ)θ˙j/θj = [(1− τK)ΠK(Kj, vj)− ρ]/σ. (7)
Variables Kj and Cj are governed by (4) and (7). When there are decreasing
returns to scale in production, ΠKK < 0, the dynamics is as follows. Because
∂K˙j/∂Kj = (1 − τK)ΠK > 0, ∂K˙j/∂Cj < 0, ∂C˙j/∂Kj = (1 − τK)ΠKKCj/σ
< 0 and [∂C˙j/∂Cj]C˙j=0 = 0, we obtain
∂K˙j
∂Kj
+
∂C˙j
∂Cj
∣∣∣∣
C˙j=0
> 0,
∂K˙j
∂Kj
∂C˙j
∂Cj
∣∣∣∣
C˙j=0
<
∂K˙j
∂Cj
∂C˙j
∂Kj
,
and there is a saddle-point solution. Hence, the co-state variable Cj (which
represents θj) jumps onto the saddle path which leads to the steady state in
which Kj, Cj and θj are constants, and limt→∞ θjKje−ρt = 0 holds.
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With constant returns to scale ΠKK ≡ 0, from (2), (4) and (6) we obtain[
K˙j
Kj
+
θ˙j
θj
− ρ
]
K˙j=0
=
[
αj
∑
k
W k − (1 + τC)Cj
Kj
]
K˙j=0
= (τK − 1)ΠK < 0.
This as well implies the transversality condition limt→∞Kjθje−ρtdt = 0.
Finally, we examine the special case where σ = 1, Π(vj, Kj) = ΠK(vj)Kj
and α = 0. In such a case, the equations (4) and (7) take the form
K˙j/Kj = (1− τK)ΠK(vj)− (1 + τC)Cj/Kj, C˙j/Cj = (1− τK)ΠK(vj)− ρ.
In this system, the co-state variable Cj jumps to the level [ρ/(1 + τC)]Kj,
which maintains the steady state K˙j/Kj = C˙j/Cj. This reconstructs
Lancing’s (1999) assertion as follows:
Proposition 1 If (i) the capitalists’ preferences are logarithmic, σ = 1,
(ii) there are constant returns to scale in production, Π(vj, Kj) = ΠK(vj)Kj,
and (iii) the capitalists earn no labour income, α ≡ 0, then the capitalists’
optimal decisions depend solely on the current rates of return or tax rates,
not on future rates of return or tax rates.
To exclude this very special case, we assume that at least one of the conditions
(i)− (iii) in proposition 1 is not true.
4 Wage settlement
The workers in industry j are organized in monopoly union j, which maxi-
mizes the value of the flow of labour income W j, discounted by the house-
holds’ rate of time preference, ρ. Given (3), this target can be written as∫ ∞
0
W je−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
W (Lj, Kj, τW , τL)e
−ρtdt. (8)
Union j takes wages paid elsewhere in the economy,
∑
k 6=j W
k, as fixed and
sets its wage wj to maximize its welfare (8), given the capitalist’s Euler
equation (7) and capital accumulation (4) and the firm’s responses (3) for
the same industry j. Because there is a one-to-one correspondence from wj
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to Lj through (2), the wage wj can be replaced by employment Lj as the
union’s policy instrument. The union then maximizes by Lj the Hamiltonian
Hj =W (Lj, Kj, τW , τL) + ξj
{
(1− τK)[FK(Kj, Lj)− µ]− ρ
}
Cj/σ
+ φj
{
αjW (Lj, Kj, τW , τL) + αj
∑
k 6=j
W k + (1− τK)Π(Kj, FL(Kj, Lj))
− (1 + τC)Cj
}
, (9)
where the co-state variables ξj and φj evolve according to
ξ˙j = ρξj − ∂Hj/∂Cj = ρξj +
{
ρ− (1− τK)[FK(Kj, Lj)− µ]
}ξj
σ
+ (1 + τC)φj,
lim
t→∞
ξjCje
−ρt = 0, (10)
φ˙j = ρφj − ∂Hj/∂Kj = [ρ− (1− τK)(ΠK +ΠvFKL)]φj − (1 + αjφj)WK ,
lim
t→∞
φjKje
−ρt = 0. (11)
Noting (2) and (3), we obtain the first-order condition for Lj as follows:
∂Hj/∂Lj = (1 + αjφj)WL + (1− τK)[FKLξjCj/σ +ΠvFLLφj]
= (1 + αjφj)
{
(1 + τW )
−1[FLL(Kj, Lj)Lj + FL(Kj, Lj)− τL]− Z ′(Lj)}
+ (1− τK)
[
FKL(Kj, Lj)ξjCj/σ − LjFLL(Kj, Lj)φj
]
= 0. (12)
5 Optimal public policy
The non-capitalists consume their entire income net of taxes, (1−α)∑j W j
/(1 + τC), where τC > −1 is the consumption tax. The government is sub-
ject to fixed expenditure E and finances these by taxing total consumption∑
j Cj +(1−α)
∑
j W
j/(1+ τC), profits
∑
j pij, wages
∑
j wjLj and employ-
ment
∑
j Lj. Its budget constraint is therefore given by
E = τC
[∑
j
Cj +
1− α
1 + τC
∑
j
W j
]
+ τK
∑
j
pij + τW
∑
j
wjLj + τL
∑
j
Lj, (13)
where τK ≤ 1 is the tax on capital income, τW > −1 the wage tax and τL the
employment tax. We assume a fixed upper limit η ∈ [0,∞) for the capital
subsidy −τK , so that3
−η ≤ τK ≤ 1. (14)
3Otherwise, the subsidy −τK could get an infinite value in the government’s optimal
optimal policy.
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Total capital accumulation
∑
j K˙j is equal to production
∑
j F (Kj, Lj) mi-
nus the capitalists’ consumption
∑
j Cj, the non-capitalists’ consumption
(1− α)∑j W j/(1 + τC), the disutility of employment in terms of consump-
tion,
∑
j Z(Lj), public spending E and capital depreciation
∑
j µKj:∑
j
K˙j =
∑
j
[
F (Kj, Lj)− Cj − 1− α
1 + τC
W j − Z(Lj)− µKj
]
− E. (15)
When (15) holds, the goods market is in equilibrium. Then, by Walras’ law,
the government budget is balanced and (13) holds as well.
Because there is perfect symmetry throughout industries j = 1, ..., J , we
obtain Kj = K, Lj = L, Cj = C, W
j = W , ξj = ξ and φj = φ. Noting this
and (2), capital accumulation (15), the Euler equation (7) and the constraints
(10)-(12) take the form
K˙ = F (K,L)− C − (1− α)W/(1 + τC)− Z(L)− µK − E/J, (16)
C˙/C = [(1− τK)[FK(K,L)− µ]/σ − ρ/σ, (17)
ξ˙ =
{
ρ+ ρ/σ − (1− τK)[FK(K,L)− µ]/σ
}
ξ + (1 + τC)φ, lim
t→∞
ξCe−ρt = 0,
(18)
φ˙ =
{
ρ− (1− τK)[FK(K,L)− FKL(K,L)L− µ]
}
φ
− (1 + τW )−1(1 + αφ)FKLL, lim
t→∞
φKe−ρt = 0, (19)
(1 + αφ)
{
(1 + τW )
−1[FLL(K,L)L+ FL(K,L)− τL]− Z ′}
+ (1− τK)
[
FKL(K,L)ξC/σ − LFLL(K,L)φ
]
= 0. (20)
A representative non-capitalist’s instantaneous utility is given by
V
(
[(1 − α)/(1 − τC)]
∑
j W
j
)
with V ′ > 0 and V ′′ < 0. We assume that
the whole population has the same constant rate of time preference, ρ > 0.
The social welfare function is then a weighted average of the non-capitalists’
and capitalists’ utilities:∫ ∞
0
[
V
( 1− α
1− τC
∑
j
W j
)
+ ϑ
∑
j
U(Cj)
]
e−ρtdt
=
∫ ∞
0
[
V
(
1− α
1− τC JW
)
+ ϑJU(C)
]
e−ρtdt, (21)
where constant ϑ > 0 is the social weight of the capitalists.
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The government sets taxes τC , τK , τL and τW for all j to maximize social
welfare (21) subject to the dynamics of the economy (16)-(19) and the con-
straints for the capital tax (14). Because there is a one-to-one correspondence
from (τL, τW ) to W and L through (3) and (12), employment and wage taxes
(τL, τW ) can be replaced by labour income W and employment L as control
variables. Noting (5), this leads to the Hamiltonian and the Lagrangean
H = V
( 1− α
1− τC JW
)
+ ϑJU(C) + γ
{
(1− τK)[FK(K,L)− µ]− ρ
}
C/σ
+ χ
{
F (K,L)− C − (1− α)W/(1 + τC)− Z(L)− µK − E/J
}
,
LG = H + ν1[τK + η] + ν2[1− τK ], (22)
where the co-state variables χ and γ evolve according to
γ˙ = ργ − ∂H/∂C = [ρ+ ρ/σ − (1− τK)(FK − µ)/σ]γ + χ− ϑJC−σ,
χ˙ = ρχ− ∂H/∂K = [ρ+ µ− FK(K,L)]χ− (1− τK)FKKCγ/σ,
lim
t→∞
χKe−ρt = 0, lim
t→∞
γCe−ρt = 0, (23)
and variables ν1 and ν2 satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
ν1[τK + η] = 0, ν1 ≥ 0, ν2[1− τK ] = 0, ν2 ≥ 0. (24)
6 Policy rules
Noting (22), the first-order condition for τK is given by
∂H/∂τK = (µ− FK)Cγ/σ + ν1 − ν2 = 0. (25)
Assume first −η < τK < 1, so that ν1 = ν2 = 0. Because ∂2H/∂(τK)2 ≡ 0, we
have to solve for τK through the generalized Clebsch-Legendre conditions:
4
∂
∂τK
(
dp
dtp
∂H
∂τK
)
= 0 for any odd integrer p,
(−1)q ∂
∂τK
(
d2q
dt2q
∂H
∂τK
)
≥ 0 for any integrer q, (26)
4Cf. Bell and Jacobson (1975), pp. 12-19.
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where t is time. Because C > 0 and (FK − µ)C˙=0 > 0 by (17), equation (25)
yields γ = 0. Differentiating (25) with respect to time t and noting (2), (7),
(17), (23) and γ = 0, we see that the Clebsch-Legendre conditions (26) hold:
d
dt
(
∂H
∂τK
)
= (µ− FK)C
σ
γ˙
∣∣
γ=0
= ΠK
C
σ
[ϑJC−σ − χ] = 0, (27)
∂
∂τK
d
dt
(
∂H
∂τK
)
= 0,
d2
dt2
(
∂H
∂τK
)
= −ΠKC
σ
[χ˙+ σϑJC−σ−1C˙] = 0, (28)
∂
∂τK
d2
dt2
(
∂H
∂τK
)
= −ΠKC
σ
[
∂χ˙
∂τK
+
σϑJ
Cσ+1
∂C˙
∂τK
]
= (ΠK)
2 ϑ
σ2
JC1−σ > 0. (29)
Given (27), we obtain
χ = ϑJC−σ. (30)
From γ = 0, (2), (17), (23), (28) and (30) it follows that
0 = χ˙+ σϑJC−σ−1C˙ = (ρ+ µ− FK)χ+ ϑJC−σ[(1− τK)ΠK − ρ]
= (ρ− ΠK)ϑJC−σ + ϑJC−σ[(1− τK)ΠK − ρ] = −ϑJC−στKΠK ,
which is equivalent to τK = 0. This yields the following result:
Proposition 2 The steady-state capital tax τK should be zero.
Noting γ = 0 and (22), the first-order conditions for W and L are
∂H/∂W = (1− α)(JV ′ − χ) = 0, ∂H/∂L = χ(FL − Z ′) = 0. (31)
Given (30) and (31), we obtain FL = Z
′, ϑC−σ = χ/J = V ′ and the results:
Proposition 3 (i) In the steady state, labour income W should be kept by
the wage tax τW such that a capitalist’s marginal utility of income, C
−σ,
times the capitalists’ social weight ϑ is equal to a non-capitalist’s marginal
utility of income, V ′.
(ii) In the steady state, employment L should be kept by the employment tax
τL such that the marginal product of labour is equal to the marginal disutility
of employment, v = FL = Z
′.
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Result (i) means that the wage tax should be used to maintain socially
optimal income distribution, and result (ii) that the employment tax should
be used to maintain efficient labour allocation.
Because the marginal disutility of employment is a non-observable vari-
able, we have to find another expression for proposition 2(ii). The system
(15) and (7) produces a steady state in which K and C are kept constant.
Given C˙ = 0, (2), (7) and proposition 2, we obtain
ρ = FK(K,L)− µ = ΠK . (32)
Hence, the elasticity of the marginal product of capital, FK−µ, with respect
to employment L in industry j, when capital K is kept constant, is
²
.
=
L
FK − µ
∂(FK − µ)
∂K
=
1
ρ
LFKL > 0. (33)
Noting (2), (3), (32), propositions 2 and 3 and the symmetry, conditions
(11)-(12) become
ξ˙ = ρξ + (1 + τC)φ = 0, lim
t→∞
φKe−ρt = 0, (34)
φ˙ = LFKL[φ− (1 + τW )−1(1 + αφ)] = 0, lim
t→∞
φKe−ρt = 0, (35)
0 = (1 + αφ)
{
(1 + τW )
−1[FLLL+ FL − τL]− Z ′}+ FKLξC/σ − LFLLφ.
(36)
Choosing 1 + αφ = (1 + τW )φ we obtain φ˙ ≡ 0 by (35). Noting this and
choosing ξ = −(1 + τC)φ/ρ, we obtain ξ˙ ≡ 0 by (34). Inserting these results
and (33) into the equation (36) and noting proposition 3(ii), we obtain 0 =
FKLCξ/σ − (τL + τWv)φ. From this and the definition (33) it follows that
−τL − τWv = −FKLC
σ
ξ
φ
= (1 + τC)FKL
C
ρσ
= (1 + τC)
C²
Lσ
> 0.
This outcome can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 4 In the steady state, total subsidies to wages and employment,
−τL − τWv, are positive and they must be financed by consumption taxation.
The employment subsidy −τL should then be equal to (1 + τC)CL ²σ + τWv,
where (1+ τC)
C
L
is the capitalist’s consumption expenditure per employment,
² the elasticity of the marginal product of capital with respect to employment,
τWv the wage tax per employment and 1/σ the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution for a capitalist.
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This tax rule changes the slope of the labour demand function so that
the unions set the marginal products of labour, FL, equal to its members’
marginal disutility of employment, V .
From (32) and proposition 3(ii), it follows that the value (K∗, L∗) for
(K,L) in the steady state with γ = 0 is determined by two equations
FK(K
∗, L∗) = ρ + µ and FL(K∗, L∗) = Z ′(L∗). Noting (24) and (25), we
obtain the following. If γ > 0 (γ < 0), then the capital subsidy (tax) should
be raised to the maximum, −τW = η (τW = 1), so that the capitalist accu-
mulates (exhausts) capital, K˙ > 0 (K˙ > 0). This can be rephrased as:
Proposition 5 The equilibrium values K∗ and L∗ for capital K and em-
ployment L are given by FK(K
∗, L∗) = ρ+ µ and FL(K∗, L∗) = Z ′(L∗). The
government should encourage (discourage) investment in industry j as long
as capital K is above (below) its equilibrium level K∗, K˙ > 0 (K˙ < 0).
Since the system ends up with a steady state in which K, C, χ and γ are
constants, conditions limt→∞Kχe−ρt = 0 and limt→∞Cγe−ρt = 0 hold.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines optimal taxation in a unionized economy. Workers form
a union, which raises their wage above the marginal disutility of employment.
Some (or all) households specified as capitalists save and earn a fixed pro-
portion of all wages, while the others specified as non-capitalists spend all of
their income. A labour union takes the firms’ and capitalists’ employment
and investment behaviour as constraints in wage settlement. Wages are de-
termined at the level of a single firm, at the level of the whole economy, or at
some intermediate level. The government can tax consumption, employment,
wages and capital income. The main findings of this paper are the following.
Zero taxation of capital income applies to unionized economies as well.
Aggregate production efficiency can be maintained by the taxes on consump-
tion, wages and employment, which are commonly used in modern industrial
economies.5 The sum of wage and employment subsidies per worker should
be positive and the consumption tax is needed to finance these. The wage
5The wage and employment taxes are equivalent to progressive labour taxation.
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tax should be set so as to keep the marginal utility of a non-capitalist equal
to the marginal utility of a capitalist times the capitalists’ weight in the so-
cial welfare function. There is a specific elasticity rule for the determination
of the employment subsidy. This changes the slope of the labour demand
curve, so that the union sets its wage equal to the marginal disutility of em-
ployment. These tax rules hold for any proportion of wages earned by the
capital-saving households.
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